Strongswan zu strongswan

Config is the same on both sites

ipsec.conf

Erklärung

Option	Bedeutung	Beispiel
conn	VPN Verbindung	to-office
authby	Authentifizierungsverfahren	secret rsasig
keyexchange	Internet Key Exchange	ikev1 ikev2
left	IP des einen VPN Gateways	10.82.227.12
right	IP des anderen VPN Gateways	10.82.227.22
leftnet	Netzwerk hinter dem einen VPN Gateway	10.82.243.0/24
rightnet	Netzwerk hinter dem anderen VPN Gateway	10.82.244.0/24
ike	Crypto-Suite Phase 1 bestehend aus Symetrisches Verschlüsselungsverfahren Hash Algorithmus Diffie-Hellman-Gruppe	aes256-sha256-modp4096
esp	Crypto-Suite Phase 1 bestehend aus Symetrisches Verschlüsselungsverfahren Hash Algorithmus Diffie-Hellman-Gruppe	aes256-sha256-modp4096
auto	Verhalten der VPN	start route
mobike	Verhalten von NAT-Traversal	yes no

Datei

conn s2s
     authby=secret
     keyexchange=ikev1
     left=10.82.227.12
     leftid=10.82.227.12
     leftsubnet=10.82.243.0/24
     mobike=no
     right=10.82.227.22
     rightid=10.82.227.22
     rightsubnet=10.82.244.0/24
     ike=aes256-sha256-modp4096!
     esp=aes256-sha256-modp4096!
     auto=start

ipsec.secrets

10.82.227.12 10.82.227.22  : PSK "suxer"

Up

• ipsec up s2s

initiating Main Mode IKE_SA s2s[3] to 10.82.227.22
generating ID_PROT request 0 [ SA V V V V V ]
sending packet: from 10.82.227.12[500] to 10.82.227.22[500] (180 bytes)
received packet: from 10.82.227.22[500] to 10.82.227.12[500] (160 bytes)
parsed ID_PROT response 0 [ SA V V V V ]
received XAuth vendor ID
received DPD vendor ID
received FRAGMENTATION vendor ID
received NAT-T (RFC 3947) vendor ID
selected proposal: IKE:AES_CBC_256/HMAC_SHA2_256_128/PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256/MODP_4096
generating ID_PROT request 0 [ KE No NAT-D NAT-D ]
sending packet: from 10.82.227.12[500] to 10.82.227.22[500] (652 bytes)
received packet: from 10.82.227.22[500] to 10.82.227.12[500] (652 bytes)
parsed ID_PROT response 0 [ KE No NAT-D NAT-D ]
generating ID_PROT request 0 [ ID HASH N(INITIAL_CONTACT) ]
sending packet: from 10.82.227.12[500] to 10.82.227.22[500] (108 bytes)
received packet: from 10.82.227.22[500] to 10.82.227.12[500] (92 bytes)
parsed ID_PROT response 0 [ ID HASH ]
IKE_SA s2s[3] established between 10.82.227.12[10.82.227.12]...10.82.227.22[10.82.227.22]
scheduling reauthentication in 10142s
maximum IKE_SA lifetime 10682s
generating QUICK_MODE request 1581114031 [ HASH SA No KE ID ID ]
sending packet: from 10.82.227.12[500] to 10.82.227.22[500] (716 bytes)
received packet: from 10.82.227.22[500] to 10.82.227.12[500] (716 bytes)
parsed QUICK_MODE response 1581114031 [ HASH SA No KE ID ID ]
selected proposal: ESP:AES_CBC_256/HMAC_SHA2_256_128/MODP_4096/NO_EXT_SEQ
CHILD_SA s2s{3} established with SPIs c2c20b47_i c1f461d9_o and TS 10.82.243.0/24 === 10.82.244.0/24
connection 's2s' established successfully

Down

• ipsec down s2s

closing CHILD_SA s2s{3} with SPIs c2c20b47_i (0 bytes) c1f461d9_o (0 bytes) and TS 10.82.243.0/24 === 10.82.244.0/24
sending DELETE for ESP CHILD_SA with SPI c2c20b47
generating INFORMATIONAL_V1 request 2875265242 [ HASH D ]
sending packet: from 10.82.227.12[500] to 10.82.227.22[500] (92 bytes)
deleting IKE_SA s2s[3] between 10.82.227.12[10.82.227.12]...10.82.227.22[10.82.227.22]
sending DELETE for IKE_SA s2s[3]
generating INFORMATIONAL_V1 request 510142709 [ HASH D ]
sending packet: from 10.82.227.12[500] to 10.82.227.22[500] (108 bytes)
IKE_SA [3] closed successfully